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The default rule for judicial review of agency action is that review is available 
for final agency action. Courts typically enforce this requirement by citing an explicit 
finality requirement in the text of a review statute. When a review statute does not 
mention finality, courts apply a presumption in favor of requiring final agency action. 
The Clean Water Act’s (CWA) direct-appellate-review provision does not contain an 
explicit finality requirement. This Comment analyzes whether the CWA’s direct-
review provision can overcome the presumption in favor of requiring final agency 
action. The Comment proposes a test to determine whether a statute can overcome 
the presumption, applies the test to the CWA's direct-review provision, and concludes 
that it can overcome the presumption. Finally, the Comment argues that the ripeness 
doctrine is sufficient to ensure administrative and judicial economy in the absence 
of the finality rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The default rule for judicial review of agency action is that 
review is available under the Administrative Procedure Act1 
(APA) for agency actions that are both ripe and final. Review is 
categorically unavailable under the APA for a claim that fails to 
meet both the finality and ripeness requirements.2 Judicial 
review is also available when Congress has allowed for review of 
specific actions via direct-review statutes.3 Although courts must 
still address the ripeness issue, it is not always clear whether 
Congress intended these statutes to restrict direct review to final 
agency actions. This is because the language of the statutes varies. 
Some statutes explicitly require final agency action, while others 
 
 1 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
 2 See, for example, National Park Hospitality Association v Department of the Interior, 
538 US 803, 807–12 (2003) (concluding that a final agency action was not ripe for review). 
 3 The term “review statute” can refer to any statute that provides for judicial review 
of agency action. A “direct-review statute” refers to a review statute that provides for direct 
appellate review. This Comment examines direct-review statutes and uses the two terms 
interchangeably to refer to statutes that provide for direct appellate review. 
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are silent on a finality requirement.4 When facing this uncer-
tainty, courts typically apply an interpretive presumption in fa-
vor of requiring final agency action for judicial review and, almost 
uniformly, rule that finality is required.5 The Clean Water Act6 
(CWA) contains one such direct-appellate-review provision that is 
silent on the question of finality. 
Congress passed the CWA in 1972 as an amendment to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.7 Congress enacted 
the amendment to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”8 The CWA outlaws 
the “discharge of toxic pollutants”9 and then requires dischargers 
to secure a permit to pollute.10 Known as the National Permit 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), the system prohibits 
the discharge of all pollutants from pollution sources subject to 
the issuance of a permit by the appropriate issuing authority.11 
The CWA tasks the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with 
overseeing the CWA’s implementation and allows either individ-
ual states or the federal government to manage the permit 
program within a state’s boundaries.12 Most states have opted to 
adopt and manage their own NPDES program.13 Pollution control 
is achieved through the permit system and the enforcement of 
strict federal technology-based standards, performance-based 
standards, and water quality standards.14 
Section 509(b) of the CWA authorizes direct judicial review of 
seven categories of EPA actions but does not explicitly require 
that those actions be final actions to qualify for review.15 The cir-
cuits are split as to whether courts should read a finality require-
ment into the statute. This Comment analyzes whether the CWA’s 
direct-review provision can overcome the presumption in favor of 
 
 4 See Sundeep Iyer, Comment, Jurisdictional Rules and Final Agency Action, 125 
Yale L J 785, 790–92 (2016) (describing variations in the text of direct-review statutes). 
 5 See Part I.B. 
 6 Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (1972), codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. 
 7 62 Stat 1155, codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. 
 8 33 USC § 1251(a). 
 9 33 USC § 1251(a)(3). 
 10 33 USC § 1342(a). 
 11 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Law and Policy 558 (Foundation 3d ed 2015). 
 12 See 33 USC § 1251(d); 33 USC § 1342. 
 13 NPDES State Program Information (EPA, Feb 19, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
G2JC-BVTM (“Withdrawal Petitions” tab) (“EPA has authorized 46 states and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands to implement the NPDES program.”). 
 14 Revesz, Environmental Law and Policy at 558 (cited in note 11). 
 15 CWA § 509(b), 86 Stat at 892, 33 USC § 1369(b). 
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requiring finality, concludes that it can overcome the presump-
tion, and argues that the ripeness doctrine is sufficient to ensure 
administrative and judicial economy in the absence of a finality 
rule. While this Comment is limited to analyzing the CWA, the 
analysis may also apply to other direct-review statutes that do 
not explicitly require final agency action. 
Part I of this Comment explains the relevant judicial review 
doctrines and statutes, as well as the presumption in favor of 
requiring finality. Part II details the case law on whether § 509(b) 
requires final agency action for direct review and suggests an 
appropriate framework to use in deciding whether a statute 
overcomes the presumption in favor of requiring finality. Part III 
applies the suggested test to § 509(b) and, finding that the pre-
sumption is overcome, concludes that the statute should be read 
to allow for review of nonfinal action. Additionally, Part III argues 
that the ripeness doctrine is sufficient to address concerns about 
administrative and judicial economy and is welfare maximizing 
when not paired with a finality rule. Part III also argues that 
eliminating the requirement of finality will not lead to an expan-
sion of protective lawsuits as parties seek to avoid the effects of 
§ 509(b)’s preclusion provision. 
I.  SETTING THE TABLE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Part explains the requirements for judicial review of 
agency action and the CWA’s direct-review provision. Part I.A 
explains the relevant judicial review doctrines of finality and 
ripeness. Part I.B describes the presumption in favor of requiring 
final agency action for judicial review and demonstrates how 
courts have applied the presumption across a range of statutes. 
Moving to the statutory vehicles for judicial review, Part I.C details 
the APA’s and CWA’s judicial review provisions. 
A. The Finality and Ripeness Doctrines: A Rules-versus-
Standards Redux 
This Section explains the judicial review doctrines of finality 
and ripeness by framing the doctrines within the classic rules-
versus-standards framework.16 At the most abstract level, the two 
doctrines serve judicial economy and seek to balance this efficiency 
interest with the concern that an agency action might “unduly 
 
 16 For a description of the rules-versus-standards framework, see Ward Farnsworth, 
The Legal Analyst: A Toolkit for Thinking about the Law 163–71 (Chicago 2007). 
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burden private parties.”17 While similar enough that courts often 
blend the doctrines, they are analytically distinct.18 Separating 
the two doctrines is vital to gaining an understanding of each rule 
and its potential applications. 
1. Finality. 
Finality is best thought of as a hard-and-fast rule of judicial 
review. When the underlying review statute requires finality, a 
court must look to whether the challenged action is a final action. 
Either an action is final and review is appropriate, or it is nonfinal 
and therefore not subject to review.19 In Bennett v Spear,20 the 
Supreme Court announced a two-part test for identifying a “final 
agency action.”21 First, the challenged action must “mark the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must 
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.”22 Neverthe-
less, the “mere possibility that an agency might reconsider” its 
action “does not suffice to make an otherwise final agency action 
nonfinal.”23 Second, “the action must be one by which ‘rights or 
obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal conse-
quences will flow.’”24 If an action satisfies both prongs, it consti-
tutes final agency action.25 While the finality rule has become 
more standard-like in recent years, it maintains the primary 
characteristics of a rule.26 Many (if not most) administrative-
review statutes allow for review only of a final agency action.27 As 
will be discussed in Part I.B, the Supreme Court has recognized 
the “strong presumption [ ] that judicial review will be available 
only when agency action becomes final,” even for review statutes 
 
 17 Ticor Title Insurance Co v Federal Trade Commission, 814 F2d 731, 745 (DC Cir 
1987) (Williams concurring). 
 18 See id at 745–46 (Williams concurring). 
 19 Chicago & S Air Lines, Inc v Waterman Steamship Corp, 333 US 103, 112–13 
(1948). See also Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst at 164–65 (cited in note 16). 
 20 520 US 154 (1997). 
 21 Id at 178. 
 22 Id (citation omitted). 
 23 Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 566 US 120, 127 (2012). 
 24 Bennett, 520 US at 178, quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Association v 
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 US 62, 71 (1970). 
 25 See Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst at 165 (cited in note 16) (explaining that the 
consequences of a rule are triggered once the facts are settled). 
 26 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan L Rev 577, 578–80 
(1988) (describing how rules devolve into standards over time and vice versa). 
 27 See, for example, 5 USC § 704. 
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that do not explicitly require final agency action.28 Consequently, 
many administrative-review cases hinge on the question whether 
an agency action is final.29 
2. Ripeness. 
If finality is the epitome of a judicial review rule, ripeness is 
its standard-like cousin. Ripeness is a constitutional and pruden-
tial doctrine. It ensures that courts hear actual cases or contro-
versies as required by Article III and allows courts to refuse to 
exercise jurisdiction if doing so would be imprudent.30 The doctrine 
is designed to prevent premature adjudication and court entangle-
ment in abstract disagreements over policy and to ensure that po-
tential plaintiffs have felt the effects of an administrative decision 
before challenging it.31 The doctrine avoids expending judicial 
resources on unrealized problems and precludes judicial interven-
tion into the policy domains of the politically accountable branches 
until the “government’s position has crystallized to the point at 
which a court can identify a relatively discrete dispute.”32 
The Supreme Court established the modern ripeness test in 
Abbott Laboratories v Gardner.33 The Court framed the ripeness 
inquiry as determining “the fitness of the issues for judicial deci-
sion” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.”34 If the issue is fit for review and the parties would 
suffer hardship were court consideration withheld, the case is 
ripe for review. In Ohio Forestry Association, Inc v Sierra Club,35 
Justice Stephen Breyer further clarified the fitness analysis by 
framing the question as examining “whether judicial intervention 
would inappropriately interfere with further administrative ac-
tion” and “whether the courts would benefit from further factual 
development of the issues presented.”36 Unlike the finality rule, 
 
 28 Bell v New Jersey, 461 US 773, 778 (1982). 
 29 See Trudeau v Federal Trade Commission, 456 F3d 178, 188–89 (DC Cir 2006); 
Ticor, 814 F2d at 746 (Williams concurring). 
 30 Reno v Catholic Social Services, Inc, 509 US 43, 57 n 18 (1993). See also Stolt-
Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds International Corp, 559 US 662, 670 n 2 (2010). 
 31 See National Park Hospitality Association v Department of the Interior, 538 US 
803, 807–08 (2003) (explaining the rationale behind and evaluative method in the ripeness 
test), quoting Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387 US 136, 148–49 (1967). 
 32 Richard J. Pierce Jr, 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 15.12 at 1334 (Wolters 
Kluwer 5th ed 2010). 
 33 387 US 136 (1967). 
 34 Id at 149. 
 35 523 US 726 (1998). 
 36 Id at 733. 
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the ripeness standard requires the judge to weigh different factors 
to determine whether the claim is ready for adjudication.37 The 
Court has described the ripeness inquiry as involving “the exercise 
of judgment, rather than the application of a black-letter rule.”38 
B. Bell v New Jersey: The Presumption in Favor of Requiring 
Finality 
The Supreme Court has recognized a “strong presumption [ ] 
that judicial review will be available only when agency action be-
comes final,” even if the direct-review statute does not mention 
finality.39 The presumption has never been overcome. The origin 
of the presumption in favor of finality is the 1938 Supreme Court 
case Federal Power Commission v Metropolitan Edison Co.40 
There, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) issued an order 
launching an investigation into the Metropolitan Edison Company 
and other power companies.41 The corporations brought suit under 
the relevant direct-review statute, which provided for review of 
an order after an application for rehearing occurred.42 The Court 
rejected the companies’ argument that the direct-review provision 
allowed for review of a procedural order. In the Court’s view, the 
language of the direct-review provision should not “be construed 
as authorizing a review of every order that the Commission may 
make, albeit of a merely procedural character.”43 The Court 
opined that such a construction would allow for constant delays 
and do violence to the purpose of the provision.44 Citing prior prec-
edent in which the Court had rejected jurisdiction of appeals of 
“mere preliminary or procedural orders” sought on the basis of “a 
supposed or threatened injury . . . before the prescribed adminis-
trative remedy has been exhausted,” the Court held that the 
appellate court had lacked jurisdiction over the appeal of the 
FPC’s decision to order a hearing.45 
 
 37 See Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst at 163–64 (cited in note 16). 
 38 National Park Hospitality Association, 538 US at 814. 
 39 Bell, 461 US at 778. 
 40 304 US 375 (1938). 
 41 Id at 376–77. 
 42 The relevant statutory text in the Federal Power Act provided that “[a]ny party to 
a proceeding under this Act aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such 
proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id at 383, 
quoting Public Utility Act of 1935 § 313(b), 49 Stat 838, 860, codified as amended at 16 
USC § 825l(b). 
 43 Metropolitan Edison, 304 US at 383. 
 44 Id at 383–84. 
 45 Id at 385–87. 
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In Bell v New Jersey,46 the Court distilled Metropolitan Edison’s 
language into a presumption in favor of requiring finality.47 
There, the question was whether final agency action was required 
for appellate jurisdiction when the direct-review statute was 
silent as to any finality requirement and provided for review of 
“any action.”48 The Court held that jurisdiction was contingent on 
the presence of a final agency action.49 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor cited Metropolitan Edison and established 
the “strong presumption [ ] that judicial review will be available 
only when agency action becomes final.”50 Examining the relevant 
statutes, the Court held that there was no indication in the 
provision’s text to “overcome that presumption.”51 Moreover, the 
relevant statutes all mentioned finality and strongly suggested 
that “only a ‘decision’ of the [agency] is subject to review.”52 The 
absence of a reference to final orders was not enough to overcome 
the presumption in favor of requiring finality as, in O’Connor’s 
view, the statutory scheme required final agency action.53 
Lower courts have taken a similar approach and declined to 
find that silence is sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor 
of requiring finality. Most often, the reviewing court will cite 
Bell’s presumption and then look to some combination of the leg-
islative history, statutory scheme, and purpose of the statute. For 
example, in Columbia Riverkeeper v United States Coast Guard,54 
which involved the Coast Guard’s recommendation to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding a proposed 
facility, the Ninth Circuit considered a statute that allowed for 
review of “an order or action . . . to issue, condition, or deny any 
permit, license, concurrence, or approval.”55 The court held that 
 
 46 461 US 773 (1983). 
 47 Id at 778. 
 48 Education Amendments of 1978 § 1232, Pub L No 95-561, 92 Stat 2143, 2350, 
codified at 20 USC § 1234d. The statute was later amended to specify “final agency action.” 
Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement 
Amendments of 1988 § 3501(a), Pub L No 100-297, 102 Stat 130, 356, codified at 20 USC 
§ 1234g. 
 49 Bell, 461 US at 778–79 (holding that 20 USC § 1234d grants federal courts juris-
diction only over a “final order of the Department” before evaluating whether the case at 
bar met that requirement). 
 50 Id at 778. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Bell, 461 US at 778–79. 
 54 761 F3d 1084 (9th Cir 2014). 
 55 Id at 1085, 1091, quoting 15 USC § 717r(d)(1). 
2018] What about Bell? 153 
 
the statute did not overcome Bell’s presumption for several rea-
sons. First, the “order” or “action” language was similar to the “any 
action” language in Bell and “order” language in Metropolitan 
Edison.56 Second, decisions that “issue, condition, or deny any 
permit, license, concurrence, or approval” are final decisions 
anyway.57 Third, courts have a long history of interpreting “an 
order” to mean “final orders” in FERC-related contexts.58 Finally, 
allowing review of every interim action would be contrary to the 
statute’s purpose of expediting siting decisions for power pro-
jects.59 The statute’s silence on finality was not sufficient to over-
come Bell’s presumption. 
The DC Circuit tread the same path to find that a review stat-
ute required final agency action in Meredith v Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Review Commission.60 The statute dictated that “any 
order issued by the Commission . . . shall be subject to judicial 
review” under 30 USC § 816(a)(1), which itself provides for review 
of “an order of the Commission.”61 Employees of the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA), who were seeking review of 
an internal MSHA policy, argued that Bell’s presumption was 
overcome because the statute referred to “final order[s]” in other 
sections but used the term “order” in the section relevant to the 
case.62 
The DC Circuit disagreed.63 Admitting that a direct expression 
from Congress would control, the court found no reason to deviate 
from Bell’s presumption requiring final agency action.64 The court 
cited the statute’s legislative history, which described the judicial 
review section as “providing for the review of final orders; no 
mention is made of earlier review.”65 Absent clear evidence to the 
contrary, and with legislative history strongly suggesting that 
 
 56 Columbia Riverkeeper, 761 F3d at 1091–92. 
 57 Id at 1092, quoting 15 USC § 717r(d)(1). 
 58 Columbia Riverkeeper, 761 F3d at 1092. 
 59 Id. 
 60 177 F3d 1042 (DC Cir 1999). 
 61 Id at 1047. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id at 1047–48. 
 64 Meredith, 177 F3d at 1048. 
 65 Id, citing Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, S Rep No 95-181, 95th Cong, 
1st Sess 13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 USCCAN 3401, 3413, and Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Amendments Act of 1977, HR Rep No 95-655, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 53 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 USCCAN 3485, 3501. 
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only final orders were subject to review, the court held that Bell’s 
presumption controlled.66 
A third example of a court refusing to find that a statute 
overcomes Bell’s presumption is Carolina Power and Light Co v 
United States Department of Labor.67 Following the pattern of 
Columbia Riverkeeper and Meredith, the Fourth Circuit rejected 
the argument that, because a statute used the term “order” rather 
than “final order,” Bell’s presumption was defeated.68 The judicial 
review statute at issue in Carolina Power provided for review of 
“an order” by the secretary of labor granting or denying relief to 
the parties involved in a whistle-blowing suit at the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.69 The court held that despite the stat-
ute’s reference to an “‘order’ rather than ‘final order,’ [the] 
omission alone is insufficient to overcome” Bell’s presumption.70 
Looking to the statutory scheme, the court stated that any action 
taken by the secretary of labor would be inherently final any-
way.71 Therefore, the employee’s challenge to the secretary’s deci-
sion to remand the case to an administrative-law judge was not 
reviewable under the statute.72 
On the one hand, the cases described above demonstrate that 
courts applying Bell’s presumption have consistently held that 
neither the omission of the word “final” nor the inclusion of the 
word “any” is enough to overcome the presumption. On the other 
hand, courts are inconsistent in that they will look to different 
sources of evidence of congressional intent on an ad hoc basis. No 
court describes a default standard or test to use when deciding 
whether Bell’s presumption is overcome. Courts will look to the 
statutory scheme, the legislative history, and the relevant act’s 
purpose to determine whether the presumption is overcome. If 
Congress has not indicated an intent to overcome the presump-
tion, or if the evidence supports either outcome, courts have held 
that the presumption controls. 
 
 66 Meredith, 177 F3d at 1048. 
 67 43 F3d 912 (4th Cir 1995). 
 68 Id at 914. 
 69 Id at 913–14. 
 70 Id at 914, quoting Jim Walter Resources, Inc v Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission, 920 F2d 738, 743 (11th Cir 1990). 
 71 Carolina Power, 43 F3d at 914 (observing that the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974 was structured so that the secretary of labor must issue an order that is “inherently 
‘final’ in nature”). 
 72 Id at 915. 
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C. Judicial Review Provisions: The APA and the CWA 
This Section discusses the judicial review provisions of the 
APA and the CWA. It demonstrates how the APA codifies the 
finality doctrine for most administrative-review actions but 
explicitly allows for exceptions to the finality principle. It then 
discusses the CWA’s direct-review provision, § 509(b)(1), explain-
ing which actions are directly reviewable and, importantly, the 
provision’s review-preclusion rule. 
1. The APA: 5 USC § 704. 
The APA established operating procedures for agencies and 
the default framework for judicial review.73 Drawing on judicially 
established rules for administrative review,74 the APA codifies the 
finality doctrine for certain agency actions. The APA’s judicial 
review provision authorizes review of “[a]gency action made re-
viewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no 
other adequate remedy in a court.”75 It also states that a “prelim-
inary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not 
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final 
agency action.”76 
The text of the statute thus contemplates two forms of admin-
istrative review. The first form is review of final agency actions. 
The second form is direct review of nonfinal actions that have 
been made reviewable by another statute. The “final” modifier in 
§ 704 applies to agency action with no other remedy in court, not 
“agency action made reviewable by statute.”77 That is, a party may 
bring a claim under the APA to challenge a nonfinal action directly 
reviewable under another statute. Recent Supreme Court deci-
sions agree with this reading.78 
 
 73 See Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 
Fordham Envir L Rev 207, 221 (2016). 
 74 See Office of the Attorney General, Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee 
on Administrative Procedure 85 (Government Printing Office 1941) (explaining that the 
finality requirement “has been formulated by the courts in the absence of legislation”). 
 75 5 USC § 704. 
 76 5 USC § 704. 
 77 Iowa League of Cities v Environmental Protection Agency, 711 F3d 844, 863 n 12 
(8th Cir 2013) (finding that “final” does not modify “agency action made reviewable by stat-
ute”). But see Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc v Federal Election Commission, 
711 F2d 279, 284 n 9 (DC Cir 1983) (concluding that Congress intended that review of 
“agency action made reviewable by statute” would be restricted to final agency actions). 
 78 See Norton v Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 US 55, 61–62 (2004) (“Where 
no other statute provides a private right of action, the ‘agency action’ complained of must 
be ‘final agency action.’”); Lujan v National Wildlife Federation, 497 US 871, 882 (1990) 
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Review of nonfinal actions thus comports with the framework 
of the APA. Despite codifying the finality requirement, the APA 
contemplated that some “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate” 
actions could be made reviewable by statute. The Supreme Court 
and the circuit courts have acknowledged this distinction.79 The 
challenge, then, is that courts have been unwilling to recognize 
that some statutes authorize review for nonfinal actions. While 
courts are willing to pay lip service to the idea that such a review 
statute exists, no court has construed a statute to that effect. 
2. The CWA: § 509(b). 
Section 509(b) of the CWA provides a private right of action 
for direct appellate review of nonfinal EPA actions. Based on sim-
ilar provisions in the Clean Air Act80 (CAA) amendments of 1970,81 
the CWA creates a bifurcated system of direct judicial review of 
actions taken by the EPA administrator.82 For some actions, the 
CWA grants original jurisdiction in the district courts through 
§ 505.83 For other actions, the courts of appeals have original 
jurisdiction under § 509(b)(1).84 Section 509(b)(1) also contains a 
review-preclusion provision requiring litigants to file suit within 
120 days of the administrator’s action.85 If a party fails to file 
within the time limit, review is barred unless new reasons for 
review arise after the 120th day.86 The statute also prohibits liti-
gants from challenging the promulgation of a regulation and 
 
(“When, as here, review is sought not pursuant to specific authorization in the substantive 
statute, but only under the general review provisions of the APA, the ‘agency action’ in 
question must be ‘final agency action.’”). 
 79 See, for example, Iowa League, 711 F3d at 863 n 12 (determining whether a non-
final agency action was reviewable under the terms of the CWA). See also Flue-Cured 
Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
313 F3d 852, 857 (4th Cir 2002) (specifying that courts, when assessing jurisdiction, must 
look to whether agency action is final or made specifically reviewable by statute). 
 80 Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq. 
 81 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, codified at 42 USC 
§ 7401 et seq. 
 82 Daniel P. Selmi, Jurisdiction to Review Agency Inaction under Federal Environ-
mental Law, 72 Ind L J 65, 72 (1996). 
 83 33 USC § 1365 (authorizing citizen suits against any person or government actor 
violating the CWA and against the administrator of the EPA for failure to perform non-
discretionary actions). 
 84 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 85 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). The statute’s review-preclusion provision functions as a 120-
day statute of limitations. If 120 days have passed since the EPA action, no party can 
challenge the action’s validity. 
 86 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
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other listed actions in an enforcement proceeding.87 For example, 
if the EPA enforced a regulation against a farmer, the preclusion 
provision prevents the farmer from challenging the promulgation 
of the underlying regulation. 
Deciding which court to file suit in is often a complex and 
messy affair.88 If a party decides to file suit under § 505, it risks 
being subject to § 509(b)’s preclusion effect. This would occur 
when a party files a § 505 suit, but the court decides that the 
litigant should have brought suit in the court of appeals via 
§ 509(b). If 120 days have passed, the litigant will be unable to 
bring its challenge in the proper forum.89 This quandary has 
resulted in CWA litigants filing suit in both the district court and 
the court of appeals to protect themselves from § 509(b) preclusion. 
Section 509(b) also contains a claim-preclusion provision requiring 
litigants to file suit within 120 days of the administrator’s action.90 
If a party fails to file within the time limit, review is barred unless 
reasons for review arise after the 120th day.91 The statute also 
prohibits a party from seeking judicial review of the administra-
tor’s actions in a later enforcement proceeding if that action was 
reviewable under § 509(b).92 
Section 509(b) allows for review of the “Administrator’s action 
in” (1) promulgating rules, (2) making determinations, and (3) ap-
proving, issuing, or denying rules or permits.93 Unlike the CAA’s 
 
 87 33 USC § 1369(b)(2). 
 88 See David P. Currie, Judicial Review under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 Iowa L 
Rev 1221, 1225–47 (1977) (criticizing § 509(b) and cataloguing wasteful litigation over 
whether a case has been brought in the right court under the CWA’s and CAA’s review 
statutes). 
 89 See note 85. 
 90 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 91 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 92 33 USC § 1369(b)(2). 
 93 See 33 USC § 1369(b)(1): 
Review of the Administrator’s action (A) in promulgating any standard of per-
formance under section 1316 of this title, (B) in making any determination pur-
suant to section 1316(b)(1)(C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent 
standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, 
(D) in making any determination as to a State permit program submitted under 
section 1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limi-
tation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title, 
(F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 1342 of this title, and (G) in 
promulgating any individual control strategy under section 1314(l) of this title, 
may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 
United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person resides or 
transacts business which is directly affected by such action upon application by 
such person. 
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almost identical direct-review provision, which explicitly mentions 
a finality requirement, § 509(b) does not mention final agency ac-
tion.94 The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether § 509(b) 
requires final agency action for judicial review, and the question 
has split the circuits. This Comment seeks to resolve the split by 
offering a framework to guide courts in deciding whether a final-
ity requirement exists. Employing that framework, this Comment 
argues that § 509(b) allows for review of nonfinal actions. 
II.  FINALITY IN § 509 
This Part describes the circuit split over whether § 509(b) 
contains a finality requirement. Part II.A discusses holdings from 
six circuits that have directly ruled on whether § 509(b) requires 
final agency action, as well as the Eighth Circuit’s ruling that no 
such requirement exists. Part II.B recognizes that the conflicting 
opinions are operating without a basic test to judge whether 
§ 509(b) can overcome Bell’s presumption. To fill this need, 
Part II.B proposes a test that courts should use when analyzing 
whether a statute can rebut the presumption in favor of requiring 
finality. 
A. The Circuit Split 
This Section describes the circuit split over whether § 509(b) 
contains a finality requirement. First, this Section discusses the 
holdings of various circuits that have interpreted § 509(b) to re-
quire final agency action for review. The Fifth and the Eleventh 
Circuits required finality based on the text of the statute. The 
Third and Seventh Circuits based their decision to require final 
action on judicial-economy concerns. The Fourth Circuit looked to 
legislative history, and the First Circuit relied solely on the Bell 
presumption. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits have all found that § 509(b) should be read to 
include a finality requirement.95 This Section also discusses the 
 
 94 The CAA’s direct-review provision mentions “final action taken” and “any other 
final action of the Administrator.” 42 USC § 7607(b)(1). 
 95 The Second and Ninth Circuits have not explicitly addressed the finality issue but 
have issued rulings in which they have restricted review to the “iss[uance] or den[ial]” of 
a permit or when “approval or disapproval [of a state permit program] itself is being 
challenged.” See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 587 F2d 549, 556 (2d Cir 1978); Southern California Alliance of Publicly 
Owned Treatment Works v U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 853 F3d 1076, 1085–86 
(9th Cir 2017). But see note 150 (discussing conflicting case law in the Ninth Circuit). These 
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Eighth Circuit’s recent holding that § 509(b) contains no finality 
requirement. 
1. Finality is required. 
In National Pork Producers Council v United States 
Environmental Protection Agency,96 the Fifth Circuit held that 
§ 509(b) contains a finality requirement.97 There, groups repre-
senting agricultural interests opposed CWA feed lot regulations 
by challenging guidance letters that the EPA sent to members of 
Congress and a farm executive.98 The court ultimately held that 
it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the EPA 
letters.99 It based its conclusion on the belief that the text of 
§ 509(b) included an explicit finality requirement.100 This was a 
mistake; § 509(b) does not contain the words “final action.”101 
In Riverkeeper v United States Environmental Protection 
Agency,102 the Eleventh Circuit stated that § 509(b) “is not the 
type of provision that overcomes the strong presumption that 
judicial review is available only when there is final agency 
action.”103 Though the court admitted that the question “is a close 
case,” it ultimately held that § 509(b) requires final agency action 
for judicial review.104 Environmental groups had brought suit 
seeking to have the EPA withdraw Alabama’s authorization 
under the CWA to administer its own NPDES permit.105 After 
considering the petition and the response from the Alabama 
Department of Environmental Management, the EPA issued an 
“interim response,”106 stating that twenty-two of the twenty-six 
alleged deficiencies “did not warrant [the] initiation of program 
 
rulings suggest that both circuits would take a narrow approach to § 509(b) jurisdiction 
and would not allow for review of nonfinal action under the other § 509(b) provisions. Neither 
circuit has dealt directly with the Bell presumption. The Eighth Circuit has taken a simi-
lar approach to § 509(b)(1)(F) but has ruled that, as a general matter, § 509(b) does not 
require final agency action. See note 77. 
 96 635 F3d 738 (5th Cir 2011). 
 97 See id at 756. 
 98 Id at 741. 
 99 Id at 748–49. 
 100 National Pork, 635 F3d at 755, quoting 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 101 See 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 102 806 F3d 1079 (11th Cir 2015). 
 103 Id at 1082. 
 104 Id at 1081. 
 105 Id at 1080. 
 106 Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1080. 
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withdrawal proceedings.”107 The EPA expressed “significant con-
cerns” about the remaining four alleged deficiencies, but decided to 
allow Alabama to address the EPA’s concerns before determining 
whether to initiate program withdrawal.108 The nonprofits then 
appealed the EPA’s findings on the twenty-two alleged deficien-
cies.109 Claiming that § 509(b) allows for judicial review of “any 
determination as to a State permit program,” the nonprofits ar-
gued that they could bring suit without a “final agency action.”110 
Citing Bell’s presumption, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
final agency action was required to establish subject-matter juris-
diction.111 Turning its attention to the statute’s text, the court 
identified “any determination” as the provision’s “critical 
words.”112 Citing two dictionaries, the court explained that the 
word “determination” suggests a “final decision made at the end 
of a deliberative process.”113 Finding that that “‘any’ [does not] 
take[ ] away from ‘determination’ the general notion of a conclu-
sive and irreversible decision,” the court concluded that § 509(b) 
did not overcome the Bell presumption.114 
The Third Circuit held that § 509(b) requires final agency 
action in Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v 
Environmental Protection Agency.115 In that case, petitioners 
sought review under § 509(b)(1)(A) to challenge regulations 
regarding standards of performance for new sources in the coal 
mining industry.116 Petitioners alleged that the EPA lacked au-
thority to defer promulgating new source performance standards 
for closed or abandoned mines.117 
The court readily admitted that “[u]nlike many other statutes 
providing for judicial review of agency action in the court of ap-
peals, section 509 is not in terms limited to final agency action.”118 
 
 107 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id at 1081. 
 110 Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1081. 
 111 Id at 1081–82, citing Bell, 461 US at 778. 
 112 Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1081. See also 33 USC § 1369(b)(1) (“Review of the 
Administrator’s action . . . (D) in making any determination as to a State permit program 
submitted under section 1342(b) of this title . . . may be had by any interested person in 
the Circuit Court of Appeals.”). 
 113 Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1082. 
 114 Id. 
 115 618 F2d 991 (3d Cir 1980). 
 116 Id at 993. 
 117 Id at 993–94. 
 118 Id at 994. 
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Confessing that “the absence of any finality language in sec-
tion 509 points to the availability of [nonfinal] review,” the court 
reasoned that “it does so only slightly.”119 By “stressing the word 
‘promulgation’ rather than the word ‘action,’” the court found “the 
equivalent of a finality requirement.”120 Anticipating Judge Frank 
Easterbrook’s finality rationale in American Paper Institute, Inc 
v United States Environmental Protection Agency,121 the court 
explained that because “unlimited interlocutory review could 
seriously impede the performance of the EPA’s rulemaking func-
tions, there are strong policy reasons for that reading.”122 
A similar defense of the finality requirement comes from a 
Seventh Circuit opinion authored by Easterbrook. In American 
Paper, an industry group challenged a policy statement supple-
ment concerning the tolerances for dioxin in new and renewed 
permits of paper mills using chlorine bleaching.123 The EPA’s re-
gional office in Chicago had published its own policy statement 
that was, in some respects, more onerous than the statement 
issued by the EPA’s central office.124 The court rejected the review-
ability of the supplemental statement. It found that the policy 
statement was outside the scope of actions reviewable under 
§ 509(b)(1) because it was created by the regional office rather 
than the administrator and was not “promulgated” because it 
lacked legal effect.125 
As to the question of finality, the court stated that if the 
policy statement ever led to an actual denial or modification of a 
permit, the paper mill would be entitled to judicial review.126 
Alternatively, if “the Administrator adopts [the regional office’s] 
position and a permit is turned down, modified, or rescinded, 
review will be available in state or federal court. That review, on 
a full record, will disclose the EPA’s final position, as applied to 
the plant in question.”127 As there was no “‘final’ agency action” to 
review, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.128 
 
 119 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, 618 F2d at 997. 
 120 Id. The court ultimately concluded that the suit sought to compel the EPA to 
undertake a nondiscretionary action and was therefore appropriately brought under the 
CWA’s citizen-suit provision. Id at 995. 
 121 882 F2d 287 (7th Cir 1989). 
 122 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, 618 F2d at 997. 
 123 American Paper, 882 F2d at 288. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id at 289. 
 127 American Paper, 882 F2d at 289. 
 128 Id at 289–90. 
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The court also emphasized the power of § 509(b)’s review-
preclusion provision. Fearing that a procedural morass could 
develop if the court set forth an expansive reading of § 509(b), the 
court stated that “the more we pull within § 509(b)(1), the more 
arguments will be knocked out by inadvertence later on—and the 
more reason firms will have to petition for review of everything in 
sight.”129 Envisioning a nightmare scenario, the court explained 
that if it asserted jurisdiction in this case, it “might need to hear 
challenges to every intra-office memo in which the associate deputy 
director for 4" pipes told the deputy associate director for nozzles 
what he planned to do about 4" nozzles, if some should be built.”130 
The Fourth Circuit has weighed in on the finality question, 
as well. In Champion International Corp v United States 
Environmental Protection Agency,131 the court ruled that § 509(b) 
incorporates a requirement of final agency action.132 A paper mill 
had brought an action against the EPA regarding a NPDES 
permit decision.133 One of the questions in the case was “whether 
Congress has provided for judicial review of the objections made 
by the EPA to the . . . permit prior to final action by the EPA.”134 
The court answered that question bluntly, stating “[w]e think it 
has not.”135 
To support its holding, the court relied on legislative history 
from the 1977 CWA amendments. Senator Edmund Muskie had 
made a floor statement about the EPA’s authority to assume per-
mitting power, stating that: 
The Administrator’s action in objecting to a permit would 
generally not be subject to judicial review since it will always 
be followed by further administrative action. The final issu-
ance of a permit by EPA would be subject to judicial review 
pursuant to section 509(b)(1)(F).136 
 
 129 Id at 289. 
 130 Id. 
 131 850 F2d 182 (4th Cir 1988). 
 132 Id at 187. 
 133 Id at 185. 
 134 Id at 187. 
 135 Champion, 850 F2d at 187. 
 136 Id at 188 (emphasis omitted), citing Environmental Policy Division of the Congres-
sional Research Service, 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977 470 
(Government Printing Office 1978). 
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Because Muskie was the manager of the conference bill, the court 
gave his statement “significant weight” and said that the legisla-
tive history was “clear with respect to judicial review of the EPA’s 
decision to assume issuing jurisdiction.”137 Having decided that 
§ 509(b) requires a final agency action for judicial review, the 
court concluded that judicial review would be appropriate “after 
EPA either grants or denies a permit.”138 
The First Circuit also addressed the finality question in 
Rhode Island v United States Environmental Protection Agency139 
and found that Bell’s presumption applied.140 In that case, Rhode 
Island filed a petition for interlocutory review of an order of the 
US Environmental Appeals Board (EAB).141 Specifically, Rhode 
Island challenged a denial of its motion to intervene in a pollution-
discharge permit proceeding.142 Rhode Island asserted jurisdiction 
under § 509(b)(1)(F).143 Construing the statute to apply only to an 
issuance or denial of a permit, the court rejected Rhode Island’s 
claim of jurisdiction for lack of finality because a permit had 
neither been issued nor denied.144 The court also supported its 
reasoning by citing Bell’s presumption.145 
In sum, courts have employed a variety of methods to find an 
implied finality requirement in § 509(b). Many courts cite Bell’s 
strong presumption of finality.146 Some courts look to the specific 
action listed in § 509(b) to see if the action inherently requires 
finality.147 Other courts cite legislative history.148 Lastly, courts 
will justify reading in a finality requirement based on concerns of 
judicial and administrative economy and efficiency.149 
 
 137 Champion, 850 F2d at 188. 
 138 Id at 190. 
 139 378 F3d 19 (1st Cir 2004). 
 140 Id at 23. 
 141 Id at 21. The EAB is an adjudicatory body within the EPA. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Rhode Island, 378 F3d at 22. 
 144 Id at 23. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See, for example, id. 
 147 See, for example, Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1081. 
 148 See, for example, Champion, 850 F2d at 188. 
 149 See, for example, American Paper, 882 F2d at 289. 
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2. Finality is not required. 
Only the Eighth Circuit has found that § 509(b) does not require 
final agency action.150 In Iowa League of Cities v Environmental 
Protection Agency,151 the court was asked to judge whether letters 
from the EPA to Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa violated the 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements and exceeded the limits 
of the EPA’s authority under the CWA.152 Arguing that the letters 
“effectively set forth new regulatory requirements with respect to 
water treatment processes at municipally owned sewer systems,” 
the Iowa League of Cities sought review under § 509(b)(1)(E).153 
The Eighth Circuit focused on whether the letters counted as 
“promulgations,” primarily looking to whether the letters were 
binding.154 It did not—as other courts have done when considering 
jurisdiction under § 509(b)(1)—undertake a finality analysis to 
determine subject-matter jurisdiction. Nor did it address Bell’s 
presumption. The court instead held that it had jurisdiction be-
cause the letters had a “binding effect on regulated entities” and 
could therefore be considered promulgations.155 In holding that it 
had jurisdiction, the court rejected the EPA’s argument that “no 
federal court has jurisdiction over this claim because these letters 
are not ‘final agency actions.’”156 
In a footnote, the court explained its justification for refusing 
to consider whether the EPA’s action was final.157 While admitting 
that its analysis into whether the EPA’s letters were binding 
 
 150 In Iowa League of Cities v Environmental Protection Agency, 711 F3d 844, 861–62 
(8th Cir 2013), and in City of Ames v Reilly, 986 F2d 253, 255–56 (8th Cir 1993), the Eighth 
Circuit focused on whether the EPA’s action fit into one of the actions listed in § 509(b). 
While City of Ames used similar language to other courts that have required final agency 
action under § 509(b)—and even cited American Paper and Champion International—it 
did not hold that § 509(b) contained a finality requirement. It held only that the EPA’s 
action indicating disapproval of the locality’s NPDES permit did not constitute an issuance 
or denial of a permit under § 509(b)(1)(F). 
 The Ninth Circuit has also issued conflicting case law. Compare Southern California 
Alliance, 853 F3d at 1080–86 (declining to find jurisdiction under § 509(b)(1)(E) or (F) for 
“interim” actions), with Defenders of Wildlife v United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 420 F3d 946, 955–56 (9th Cir 2005), revd and remd on other grounds, National 
Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644 (2007) (finding jurisdiction 
under § 509(b)(1)(D) to review an interim determination that was virtually determinative 
of the final agency action). 
 151 711 F3d 844 (8th Cir 2013). 
 152 Id at 854. 
 153 Id at 854, 861. See also 33 USC § 1369(b)(1)(E). 
 154 Iowa League, 711 F3d at 862. 
 155 Id at 863. 
 156 Id at 863 n 12. 
 157 Id. 
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“evokes considerations of finality,” the court countered that it de-
clined “to conjure up a finality requirement for ‘[a]gency actions 
made reviewable by statute.’”158 Noting that other Eighth Circuit 
panels cautioned that “a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there,”159 the court 
concluded its analysis by stating “[t]he CWA expressly makes 
specified agency actions reviewable, and our task therefore is to 
determine whether the asserted agency action falls within the 
statutory terms.”160 Having established that the letters were 
promulgations for jurisdictional purposes, the court then under-
took a ripeness analysis to see if the claim was ripe for review. 
The court held that it was.161 
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit that does not require 
finality for jurisdiction under § 509(b). The court took a quintes-
sentially textualist approach. Because the text of the APA does 
not require finality for “[a]gency action made reviewable by 
statute” and § 509(b) does not require finality, the court found 
that finality was not a prerequisite to an assertion of jurisdiction. 
Instead, it focused on whether the action could be understood as 
a promulgation. Notably, it addressed neither Bell’s presumption 
of finality nor Easterbrook’s concerns about judicial economy from 
American Paper. 
B. Using Block v Community Nutrition Institute as a Test for 
Bell’s Presumption 
Though courts have held that some statutes do not overcome 
Bell’s presumption, lower courts (including courts examining 
§ 509) have not articulated a test to determine when a statute 
does overcome the presumption. Despite the absence of a specific 
test for the Bell presumption, the Supreme Court has defined a 
general set of criteria to judge whether a statute overcomes an 
interpretive presumption. This Section describes these criteria 
and proposes that courts use this multifactor test when consider-
ing whether to apply Bell’s presumption. 
 
 158 Iowa League, 711 F3d at 863 n 12, citing 5 USC § 704. 
 159 Iowa League, 711 F3d at 863 n 12, quoting Yankton Sioux Tribe v Podhradsky, 606 
F3d 994, 1012 (8th Cir 2010). 
 160 Iowa League, 711 F3d at 863 n 12. 
 161 Id at 868. 
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1. The Block factors. 
In Block v Community Nutrition Institute,162 decided just one 
year after Bell, the Court confronted the question whether 
individual consumers of milk products could obtain judicial 
review of actions taken by the secretary of agriculture. The issue 
arose because the relevant statute allowed only milk handlers 
(middlemen between consumers and farmers) to seek judicial 
review.163 Acknowledging that there was a presumption in favor 
of allowing judicial review, Justice O’Connor explained that all 
such presumptions of statutory interpretation may be overcome 
by (1) “specific language,” (2) “specific legislative history that is a 
reliable indicator of congressional intent,” (3) an inference from 
“contemporaneous judicial construction barring review and the 
congressional acquiescence in it,” or (4) “the collective import of 
legislative and judicial history behind a particular statute.”164 
Narrowing her focus to the presumption favoring judicial review 
of agency action, O’Connor wrote that “inferences of intent drawn 
from the statutory scheme as a whole” may also overcome the pre-
sumption.165 Looking to the legislative scheme of the statute, the 
Court held that Congress had not intended to grant consumers 
the ability to seek judicial review of the secretary’s actions.166 
Later Court rulings affirmed the idea that inferences of intent 
from the statutory scheme may overcome “most presumptions” 
used in interpreting statutes.167 
The Block Court also established the standard of evidence 
needed to overcome presumptions. Rejecting the lower court’s 
decision to apply the “clear and convincing evidence” standard 
requiring “unambiguous proof,” O’Connor wrote that the stand-
ard, at least in the context of judicial review preclusion, is met 
whenever congressional intent is “fairly discernible.”168 When 
 
 162 467 US 340 (1984). 
 163 Id at 344–46. 
 164 Id at 349. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Block, 467 US at 351. 
 167 See Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 566 US 120, 128 (2012) (Scalia). 
Justice Antonin Scalia unsurprisingly took a textually inclined approach to presumptions. 
See, for example, United States v Fausto, 484 US 439, 444 (1988) (Scalia) (limiting the 
Block inquiry to “the purpose of the [statute], the entirety of its text, and the structure of 
review that it establishes”). 
 168 Block, 467 US at 350–51, quoting Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc v Camp, 397 US 150, 157 (1970). What is required to meet the “fairly 
discernible” standard is, itself, fairly undiscernible. The Court has not provided any guid-
ance beyond referencing the relevant evidence to which a judge should look. For example, 
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there is “substantial doubt” about congressional intent, the pre-
sumption controls.169 
In other applications of the Block test, the Court has refused 
to accept statutory silence, by itself, as sufficient evidence to over-
come the presumption favoring judicial review.170 Nevertheless, 
the Court has found that a judicial review provision in one part of 
a statute combined with omission of such a provision in another 
part provides “persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately 
intended to foreclose further review” in the latter part of the stat-
ute.171 The Court has also found that, when a statute grants one 
class of employees the ability to seek judicial review but does not 
authorize another class of employees, the statute exhibits a 
“manifestation of a considered congressional judgment that [the 
latter class] should not have statutory entitlement to review for 
adverse action.”172 These cases indicate that statutory silence plus 
another factor can be sufficient to overcome the presumption in 
favor of judicial review. 
2. Applying the Block factors to Bell’s presumption. 
As the Court has not given lower courts a clear standard 
against which to judge whether § 509(b) overcomes Bell’s presump-
tion in favor of requiring finality, the most logical standard to apply 
is the Block standard. Like the “strong presumption” in favor of 
judicial review,173 Bell’s strong presumption is a “presumption[ ] 
used in interpreting statutes.”174 Further, both presumptions re-
late to the jurisdictional power of a court to review administrative 
action.175 Perhaps most indicative of Block’s relevance to Bell is 
 
the Court has stated that to determine whether intent is fairly discernible, it looks to the stat-
ute’s “text, structure, and purpose.” Elgin v Department of the Treasury, 567 US 1, 10 (2012). 
 169 Block, 467 US at 351. 
 170 See Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667, 674 (1986), 
quoting Abbott Laboratories, 387 US at 141. 
 171 United States v Erika, Inc, 456 US 201, 208 (1982). 
 172 Fausto, 484 US at 448–49 (citing the structure of the statutory scheme as a reason 
to overcome the presumption in favor of judicial review). 
 173 Mach Mining, LLC v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 135 S Ct 1645, 
1651 (2015), quoting Bowen, 476 US at 670. 
 174 Block, 467 US at 349. 
 175 See, for example, Columbia Riverkeeper, 761 F3d at 1097 (dismissing the case for 
lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final agency action). See also Block, 467 US at 
353 n 4; Arkansas Dairy Cooperative Association, Inc v United States Department of 
Agriculture, 573 F3d 815, 829 (DC Cir 2009) (applying Block’s “specific language” factor to 
the presumption that Congress was aware of background law when legislating). 
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that the Court issued Block’s standard for overcoming all pre-
sumptions one year after establishing Bell’s presumption. The 
test that applies to “all presumptions” must necessarily apply to 
the Bell presumption.176 
Using the Block standard in the Bell context also makes 
sense because the presumption in favor of requiring finality is not 
a “clear statement rule[ ].”177 The Supreme Court has held that, 
unlike clear-statement rules, interpretive presumptions can be 
overcome without an explicit textual statement.178 In presumption 
cases, the Court looks to the intent of Congress. The Block factors 
set out how to conduct that analysis for presumption rebuttal 
purposes. While courts have not specifically applied the Block test 
to other presumptions, the test is consistent with how courts 
approach presumptions generally and is a useful guidepost for 
framing the rebuttal analysis. 
Given the Court’s declaration that “most presumptions” can 
be “overcome by inferences of [congressional] intent”179 and that 
“all presumptions” may be “overcome by specific language or 
specific legislative history,”180 it is surprising that courts have not 
explicitly used the Block framework to rule on whether a statute 
can overcome Bell’s presumption. The reason may be that Block 
dealt with the threshold presumption in favor of judicial review 
of agency action. In Bell cases, the availability of judicial review 
is not in question; it is only the timing of that review that is in 
dispute. Still, that does not explain why criteria used to judge most, 
if not all, presumptions would not apply to the Bell presumption.181 
Another possible explanation is that courts use the Bell pre-
sumption as a substitute for ripeness and not as a litmus test for 
congressional intent. Courts may assume that, if an action is not 
 
 176 Block, 467 US at 349. 
 177 See William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593, 595 n 4 (1992) (describ-
ing clear-statement rules as requiring a clear statement “to rebut a policy presumption 
the Court has created”). 
 178 See Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108–09 
(1991). While the Astoria Court did not cite Block, its test for whether to apply the relevant 
presumption rested on almost identical factors. The Court looked to whether application 
of the presumption would be “consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the statute.” Id 
at 110 (alteration omitted), quoting University of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 796 (1986). 
 179 Sackett, 566 US at 128. 
 180 Block, 467 US at 349. 
 181 See Sackett, 566 US at 128 (“[A]s with most presumptions, this one ‘may be overcome 
by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.’”), quoting Block, 467 
US at 349. 
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final, there is not an adequate record on which to base judicial 
review and that any review may disrupt further administrative 
processes.182 Framing an issue as one of finality, rather than as a 
ripeness question, may provide a common basis on which appellate 
judges can agree. Citing to the Bell presumption and cherry-picking 
factors that reinforce the presumption is likely an easier path 
than delving into the messy world of ripeness.183 That is, courts 
may be employing the Bell presumption as a bright-line rule that 
will always require finality rather than as a surmountable inter-
pretive presumption.184 If this is the case, the Block factors are 
irrelevant because a court raising the Bell presumption will likely 
ignore whatever congressional intent the factors may reveal. 
In any event, courts already usually apply at least one of the 
Block factors in Bell cases (even though they do not explicitly 
reference Block). As discussed above, courts confronting the Bell 
presumption have refused to find the presumption overcome by 
the omission of the word “final.”185 Courts have searched for 
another indicator of congressional intent. Furthermore, like the 
 
 182 Indeed, for APA cases the ripeness inquiry includes determining whether the 
agency action is final. The Supreme Court has included finality as a component of ripeness 
in the APA context when final agency action is required. See Abbott Laboratories, 387 US 
at 148–50 (finding that an action was ripe because it qualified as final agency action 
“within the meaning of [the APA]”). See also National Park Hospitality Association v 
Department of the Interior, 538 US 803, 812 (2003) (finding that the relevant action 
constituted “final agency action” within the meaning of the APA for ripeness purposes). 
The Court has not mentioned finality as an element of ripeness in other administrative 
contexts. See, for example, Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 531 US 457, 
479 (2001) (adopting the Ohio Forestry ripeness inquiry and differentiating the ripeness 
requirements for direct-review statutes from the requirements of APA review). See also 
Shalala v Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc, 529 US 1, 13 (2000) (recognizing in a 
non-APA context that “early review” is available when “the legal question is ‘fit’ for reso-
lution and delay means hardship”), citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 US at 148–49. Lower 
courts have innovated by including finality as part of the ripeness inquiry in other 
administrative-review contexts. See, for example, General Electric Co v Environmental 
Protection Agency, 290 F3d 377, 380 (DC Cir 2002) (including finality as a component of 
ripeness in a direct-review case). But see Iowa League, 711 F3d at 863 n 12 (finding an 
action ripe for review without examining whether it qualified as final agency action). 
 183 See, for example, National Park Hospitality Association, 538 US at 812 (finding 
that a final action was not ripe for review). But see id at 814–15 (Stevens concurring in 
the judgment) (finding that the case was ripe for review but voting to order dismissal be-
cause petitioner had not alleged sufficient injury); id at 817 (Breyer dissenting) (finding 
that the case was ripe for review). 
 184 Courts may be treating the Bell presumption as a clear-statement rule. See note 177 
and accompanying text. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian 
American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 261 (1991) (Marshall dissenting) (describing the conversion 
of a presumption to a clear-statement rule as relieving “a court of the duty to give effect to 
all available indicia of the legislative will”). 
 185 See Part II.A. 
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Block test, when doubt or weighty evidence exists on both sides, 
courts tend to hold that Bell’s presumption controls. Because the 
Court has explicitly held that Block’s presumption test applies to 
all interpretive presumptions186 and the case law surrounding 
Bell’s presumption involves similar considerations, it is appropri-
ate to analyze whether § 509(b) overcomes Bell by using the Block 
test as the primary analytical framework. 
III.  RELYING ON RIPENESS 
Part III.A applies the Block test to § 509(b), concluding that 
§ 509(b) overcomes Bell’s presumption in favor of requiring final 
agency action. Part III.B.1 suggests that the ripeness doctrine can 
effectively filter out frivolous claims and that removing finality will 
not lead to administrative disruption. Then, using the cases de-
scribed in Part II, Part III.B.2 explores the instances in which an 
appeal, had it not been barred by finality concerns, should have 
been found ripe for review and allowed to proceed. Finally, 
Part III.C addresses Judge Easterbrook’s concern that allowing 
review of nonfinal action would lead to chaos as litigants file 
protective lawsuits to avoid being subject to § 509(b)’s preclusion 
provision. Part III.C then argues that a flexible reading of the 
preclusion provision, consistent with Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of § 509(b), avoids Easterbrook’s nightmare scenario. 
A. Defeating Bell’s Presumption 
Of the courts that have cited Bell to justify requiring final 
agency action for review under § 509(b), none has articulated a 
test to determine what would be sufficient to overcome Bell’s pre-
sumption. Other courts have neglected to grapple with Bell at all. 
As discussed in Part II.B, the Block standard is the appropriate 
test with which to judge whether a statute can overcome Bell’s 
presumption. This Section applies the Block framework to § 509(b) 
by examining the statute’s (1) text, (2) statutory scheme and 
structure, (3) legislative history and purpose, and (4) congressional 
acquiescence in the judiciary’s expansive reading of § 509(b). The 
 
 186 Block, 467 US at 349 (explaining that “all presumptions used in interpreting statutes 
[ ] may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable 
indicator of congressional intent”). See also Sackett, 566 US at 128 (“[A]s with most pre-
sumptions, this one ‘may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory 
scheme as a whole.’”), quoting Block, 467 US at 349. 
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application of the test demonstrates that § 509(b) overcomes 
Bell’s presumption. 
1. The text does not require final agency action. 
Section 509(b) does not mention any final agency action re-
quirement. As established in Part I.B, an omission of the word 
“final” is necessary but insufficient to overcome Bell’s presump-
tion.187 Section 509(b) further differentiates itself from other 
direct-review statutes by not authorizing review for an “order” or 
“action.” The statute specifically allows for review of the adminis-
trator’s “action in” promulgating, approving, denying, or making 
any determination under other CWA statutes.188 Giving meaning 
to each word of the statute requires ascribing some effect to the 
word “in.”189 In this context, the most natural meaning to assign 
to “in” is that it extends the scope of the review authorization to 
include actions taken in the course of taking the final action. This 
interpretation authorizes review of the many different actions the 
administrator may take before making a final determination or 
other final action.190 
Other statutes, such as the provision in Columbia Riverkeeper, 
authorize review for an “order or action . . . to issue, condition, or 
deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval.”191 There, 
Congress focused on the order or action that, itself, would effectuate 
a result. In contrast, “action in” suggests Congress contemplated 
review of the many actions taken toward effectuating a result. 
 
 187 See Part I.B. 
 188 33 USC § 1369(b)(1) (emphasis added). The review statute in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub L 94-580, 90 Stat 2795, codified at 
42 USC § 6901 et seq, uses the phrase “review of action of the Administrator in” and gives 
the DC Circuit exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review. RCRA § 2, 90 Stat at 2827, 42 
USC § 6976(a)(1). In American Portland Cement Alliance v Environmental Protection Agency, 
101 F3d 772 (DC Cir 1996), the court ruled that it would have jurisdiction “only after the 
final regulations are promulgated.” Id at 779. It based this decision on the fact that, unlike 
the CWA, the RCRA statute did not provide for review of determinations. Id at 775. The 
court held that, by its “plain terms,” the statute provided for review only of the adminis-
trator’s action in “the promulgation of final regulations, the promulgation of requirements, 
and the denial of petitions for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of RCRA regula-
tions.” Id, citing 42 USC § 6976(a)(1). 
 189 See Loughrin v United States, 134 S Ct 2384, 2390 (2014) (describing “the ‘cardinal 
principle’ of interpretation that courts ‘must give effect, if possible, to every clause and 
word of a statute’”), quoting Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 404 (2000). 
 190 See 33 USC § 1369(b)(1)(B), (D). 
 191 15 USC § 717r(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
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This construction gives meaning to the final action192 and the sev-
eral actions taken in making—or whatever verb the final action 
requires, like promulgating, issuing, approving, or denying—that 
determination.193 
2. The statutory scheme does not implicate final action. 
The statutory scheme of § 509(b) also supports the inference 
that Congress intended to allow review of nonfinal actions. Unlike 
other statutes authorizing review of actions taken under ancillary 
statutes,194 which themselves mention finality or other inherently 
final actions, § 509(b) references statutes that contain a bevy of 
intermediate actions. For example, § 509(b)(1)(A) allows for 
review of the administrator’s action in promulgating a new stand-
ard of performance under § 306 of the CWA. To promulgate a new 
performance standard, the administrator must take several in-
termediate actions. First, the administrator must add a new cat-
egory to its list of source categories.195 Then, the administrator 
must propose and publish regulations “establishing Federal 
standards of performance for new sources.”196 The administrator 
may also make distinctions among “classes, types, and sizes 
within categories of new sources.”197 These are three actions that 
the administrator can take “in promulgating any standard of 
performance” and are therefore subject to review under 
§ 509(b)(1)(A). These actions are unlike final decisions of a 
board198 or entry into a settlement199 because they are actions 
taken in anticipation of a final promulgation and are not qualified 
by “final agency action” language.200 
As discussed in Part III.A.4, the Supreme Court has held that 
the underlying regulations governing actions reviewable through 
§ 509(b) are themselves subject to review under the statute.201 The 
range of actions that the administrator can take under § 509(b)’s 
 
 192 In other words, the promulgations, approvals, denials, issuances, and determina-
tions mentioned in 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 193 See 33 USC § 1369(b)(1). 
 194 See note 166. 
 195 33 USC § 1316(b)(1)(A). 
 196 33 USC § 1316(b)(1)(B). 
 197 33 USC § 1316(b)(2). 
 198 See Bell, 461 US at 777–78. 
 199 See Carolina Power, 43 F3d at 914–15. 
 200 See 5 USC § 704. 
 201 See Part III.A.4. 
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ancillary statutes reinforces the argument that § 509(b)’s author-
ization of review of “actions in” making determinations or denying 
permits should be read literally and given meaning. 
3. The legislative purpose and history are open to 
immediate review. 
Under Block and cases applying Bell, courts look to legislative 
history to see if congressional intent is fairly discernible.202 In the 
cases using legislative history to rebut the claim that a statute 
overcomes Bell’s presumption, the legislative history clearly dis-
cusses final actions.203 No such discussion exists in the legislative 
history of the CWA’s enactment. The legislative history for the 
CWA shows that the drafters did not intend to limit judicial 
review to final actions by the administrator. In fact, the enacting 
Congress envisioned a judicial review system that allowed the 
public to meaningfully participate in government decisionmaking 
through litigation. 
The CWA drafters appreciated that citizens had increasingly 
“taken the initiative in having the forum for [environmental] 
decision-making be in the court room.”204 Decrying the fact that 
agencies had closed themselves off from public input, Congress 
was interested in “open[ing] wide the opportunities for the public to 
participate in a meaningful way in the decisions of government.”205 
With that intent in mind, the CWA included a provision for “judi-
cial review of the Administrator’s actions . . . in section 509(b).”206 
The report from the House Committee on Public Works sup-
ports the proposition that § 509(b)(1) is to be construed liberally. 
The committee made clear its belief that: 
[W]ith the number and complexity of administrative determi-
nations that the legislation requires there is a need to estab-
lish a clear and orderly process for judicial review. Section 509 
will ensure that administrative actions are reviewable, but 
that the review will not unduly impede enforcement [on 
account of the review-preclusion provision in § 509(b)(2) that 
prevents litigants from raising challenges to actions in an 
 
 202 See Parts I.B, II.A.1, II.B. 
 203 See, for example, note 65 and accompanying text. 
 204 Environmental Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service, 1 A Legis-
lative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 819 (Government 
Printing Office 1973). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
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enforcement proceeding if they are reviewable under 
§ 509(b)(1)].207 
The committee’s reference to the “number” of administrative 
determinations does not implicate finality in the same way as a 
reference to a “final order” or “decision.”208 Further, Congress 
evidently thought that the anticipated increase in litigation was 
an adequate reason to consider establishing a special environ-
mental court.209 
A supplemental view included in the committee report 
suggests that administrative review of nonfinal actions was a 
palatable idea to at least one member of the enacting Congress. 
Supporting the bill, Representative John Terry of New York 
stated that “an administrative review procedure of Section 304 
guidelines, prior to their promulgation, and EPA approval or dis-
approval of State permit programs is essential.”210 Actions before 
promulgation would constitute nonfinal actions, as they would 
not represent the “consummation” of the agency’s decisionmaking 
process. Though this is the recorded view of only one legislator 
and should not, absent other factors, control a court’s interpreta-
tion of the statute, Terry’s statement demonstrates that Congress 
was at least aware of the possibility of allowing review of nonfinal 
actions. 
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments creating the 
modern CWA thus shows that Congress was interested in opening 
wide the opportunities for public participation and used the 
phrase “any determination” literally. Further, the history shows 
that at least one member of Congress actively encouraged review 
of nonfinal action. Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1972 
amendments does Congress mention that review is limited to final 
actions. 
In Champion, the Fourth Circuit erroneously used Senator 
Muskie’s 1977 CWA amendment statements on the availability of 
judicial review of EPA approval or disapproval of state permit 
 
 207 Id at 823 (emphasis added). 
 208 See Monterey Coal Co v Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 635 
F2d 291, 292 (4th Cir 1980) (discussing a Senate report stating that “[p]ersons adversely 
affected by the Commission’s final order” may seek review). See also Bell, 461 US at 778 
(highlighting that the statutes in question state that review is available for the “decision” 
of the board). 
 209 1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 at 
830 (cited in note 204) (“The increase in litigation on environmental matters . . . may well 
justify a new environmental court.”). 
 210 Id at 892 (emphasis added). 
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programs211 as evidence that Congress intended review of only 
final actions.212 The Fourth Circuit held that statement to be sig-
nificant evidence that Congress did not intend review of nonfinal 
actions under § 509(b). 
Muskie’s statement does not settle the finality question. 
Unlike Terry’s statements approving of review of nonfinal 
actions, Muskie’s floor speech occurred after Congress passed the 
CWA and cannot illuminate the legislative intent of the CWA’s 
enacting Congress. This is especially true because Muskie’s 
statement was primarily about § 402(d), not § 509(b)(1).213 As the 
Supreme Court has held, “the views of a single legislator, even a 
bill’s sponsor, are not controlling.”214 Moreover “the views of a 
subsequent Congress,” much less an individual legislator, “form 
a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”215 
Even “when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative 
history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a stat-
ute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history 
prior to its enactment.”216 Muskie’s subsequent floor statement—
only tangentially related to § 509(b)—should therefore carry lit-
tle, if any, weight in interpreting § 509(b). The legislative history 
from the original enactment should control. 
The legislative history of the 1972 CWA shows that Congress 
intended to allow review of nonfinal actions taken by the admin-
istrator. The sole excerpt of subsequent legislative history that 
contradicts Congress’s original intent is that of a single legislator 
concerning an amendment to a different statute half a decade 
later. Given Supreme Court precedent on subsequent legislative 
history, Muskie’s statement should be accorded no weight in con-
struing § 509(b). The legislative history does not contain the type 
of language that courts use to support finding an implied finality 
requirement. 
 
 211 See text accompanying note 136. 
 212 Champion, 850 F2d at 188. See also 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act 
of 1977 at 470 (cited in note 136). 
 213 See 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977 at 470 (cited in note 136). 
 214 Mims v Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 565 US 368, 385 (2012), citing Consumer 
Product Safety Commission v GTE Sylvania, Inc, 447 US 102, 118 (1980). 
 215 GTE Sylvania, 447 US at 117, quoting United States v Price, 361 US 304, 313 (1960). 
 216 GTE Sylvania, 447 US at 118 n 13. 
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4. Congress has acquiesced in the judiciary’s expansive 
reading of § 509(b). 
Block instructs interpreters seeking guidance as to whether 
a statute overcomes a presumption to look to “contemporaneous 
judicial construction” and “congressional acquiescence in it.”217 
History provides the guideposts for this analysis. Informative clues 
are (1) Congress’s 1977 amendments to the CAA and (2) Supreme 
Court cases defining the reach of § 509(b). This Section proceeds 
in chronological order: it first discusses the 1977 case, E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co v Train,218 then turns to the history of the 
1977 CAA and CWA amendments, and finally returns to § 509(b) 
in the 1980 case, Crown Simpson Pulp Co v Costle.219 As this 
Section will demonstrate, the Court has taken an expansive view 
of § 509(b)’s reach. To date, Congress has not intervened and can 
reasonably be said to have acquiesced in an expansive reading of 
§ 509(b). 
In E.I. du Pont, the Court addressed the burgeoning question 
of whether the EPA was responsible for setting NPDES permit 
standards or if it could offer only guidelines and allow variances on 
individual permits.220 The EPA argued that it had the authority to 
set national standards. The Court agreed.221 In ruling for the EPA, 
the Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that § 509(b)(1)(E)’s 
authorization of review of approvals or promulgations of standards 
under § 301 applied only to § 301(c).222 The Court held that review 
was available for all actions taken pursuant to § 301 because 
§ 509(b) did not explicitly single out § 301(c).223 Furthermore, the 
Court stated that it would be perverse to allow the court of appeals 
to review individual actions issuing or denying permits under 
§ 402 (permits that allow discharges under the NPDES program) 
but leave it “no power of direct review of the basic regulations 
governing those individual actions.”224 The Court thus construed 
the statute to authorize review of all the actions listed in 
§ 509(b)’s ancillary statutes unless otherwise specified. In other 
words, the Court interpreted the statute to allow review of the 
 
 217 Block, 467 US at 349. 
 218 430 US 112 (1977). 
 219 445 US 193 (1980) (per curiam). 
 220 See E.I. du Pont, 430 US at 124. 
 221 Id at 132–36. 
 222 Id at 136. 
 223 Id. 
 224 E.I. du Pont, 430 US at 136. 
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administrator’s action in approving or promulgating any effluent 
limitation under § 301 as long as that action was itself listed in 
§ 301. 
Congress amended the CWA in 1977 and did not revise 
§ 509(b).225 Keeping in mind the Court’s longstanding presump-
tion that Congress is “aware of an administrative or judicial 
interpretation of a statute and [ ] adopt[s] that interpretation 
when it re-enacts a statute without change,”226 Congress signaled 
its acquiescence in the Court’s expansive reading of § 509(b)(1)(E) 
in E.I. du Pont by not amending § 509(b) in the 1977 CWA amend-
ments. Four months earlier, Congress modified the CAA’s similar 
review provision by adding the phrases “or final action taken” and 
“any other final action.”227 Despite having inserted “final action” 
language into a parallel review provision just a few months earlier, 
Congress did not make the same revision to § 509(b). 
Congress’s decision to modify the CAA to explicitly reference 
final action, but to leave § 509(b) untouched, was a meaningful 
choice made in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in E.I. du Pont. 
In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd v Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
Inc,228 the Court emphasized the significance of differences in the 
language of various environmental review statutes. There, the 
Court ruled on a jurisdictional question regarding the CWA’s 
citizen-suit provision229 by looking to the statute’s “most natural 
reading.”230 The Court ruled that the statute’s failure to provide 
jurisdiction for past violations was not a “careless” error on the 
part of Congress because “Congress used identical language in 
the citizen suit provisions of several other environmental statutes 
that authorize only prospective relief” and that “Congress has 
demonstrated in yet other statutory provisions that it knows how 
to avoid this prospective implication by using language that 
explicitly targets wholly past violations.”231 The same reasoning 
applies here. Congress inserted an explicit finality requirement 
in the CAA and could have done the same with respect to the 
CWA. The inclusion of finality language in other review statutes 
demonstrates that Congress knows how to make its intent to 
 
 225 See Selmi, 72 Ind L J at 78 (cited in note 82). 
 226 Forest Grove School District v T.A., 557 US 230, 239–40 (2009), quoting Lorillard 
v Pons, 434 US 575, 580 (1978). 
 227 Selmi, 72 Ind L J at 74–75 (cited in note 82), quoting 42 USC § 7607(b)(1). 
 228 484 US 49 (1987). 
 229 33 USC § 1365. 
 230 Gwaltney, 484 US at 57. 
 231 Id. 
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restrict review to final agency action clear. Congress did not do so 
here, and that choice must be given meaning. 
Three years after Congress amended the CWA, the Court 
again interpreted § 509(b) in Crown Simpson. The question before 
the Court was whether the EPA’s veto of a state-issued permit 
qualified as a § 402 approval or denial of the permit under 
§ 509(b)(1)(F).232 Section 402 allows the EPA to either veto a pro-
posed NPDES permit or do nothing for ninety days and passively 
approve it.233 The lower court had determined that a veto of the 
state-issued permit did not constitute “issuing or denying” a per-
mit, rendering § 509(b)(1)(F) inapplicable.234 The Court disagreed, 
holding that the veto had the “precise effect” of denying a permit 
within the meaning of § 509(b), and thus reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision.235 Agreeing with a concurring opinion in the 
lower-court decision, the Court highlighted the argument that 
allowing jurisdiction over this type of action “would best comport 
with the congressional goal of ensuring prompt resolution of 
challenges to EPA’s actions.”236 Once again, the Court employed a 
“practical rather than a cramped construction” of § 509(b) that 
emphasized function over form.237 Due to these functional concerns, 
the Court allowed for direct review of an action listed in 
§ 509(b)(1)(F)’s ancillary statute but not enumerated in § 509(b). 
That is, the Court allowed for review of the EPA veto despite the 
absence of an actual permit denial.238 Congress has not amended 
§ 509(b)(1) since the Court’s ruling in Crown Simpson. 
While E.I. du Pont and Crown Simpson do not squarely ad-
dress the finality question, these cases both demonstrate that the 
Court will look beyond the final actions listed in § 509(b)(1) when 
it has prudential reasons for doing so.239 In E.I. du Pont, the Court 
 
 232 Crown Simpson, 445 US at 194. 
 233 Id. See also 33 USC § 1342(d)(2). 
 234 Crown Simpson, 445 US at 196. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
673 F2d 400, 405 (DC Cir 1982). 
 238 The Crown Simpson Court acknowledged that the 1977 amendments were passed 
after the original controversy in the case occurred. The court did not “consider the impact, 
if any, of this amendment on the jurisdictional issues presented.” Crown Simpson, 445 US 
at 194 n 2. 
 239 The Court also did not raise any jurisdictional issues related to its review of a case 
in which the Ninth Circuit asserted § 509(b) jurisdiction to review a nonfinal determination. 
See National Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644 (2007). See 
also note 150 (describing the Ninth Circuit case). But because the Court did not explicitly 
address the jurisdictional question, its assertion of jurisdiction is not protected by stare 
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declared that § 509(b) allowed for review of any action the admin-
istrator could take under § 301.240 Because § 301 contains nonfinal 
actions, the Court impliedly held that those actions were available 
for § 509(b) review. There, the Court was concerned with judicial 
economy and the problem of bifurcated review.241 Three years 
later, the Crown Simpson Court ruled that the lack of a final 
issuance or denial of a permit did not deprive the appellate court 
of jurisdiction under § 509(b)(1).242 In that instance, the Court was 
guided by the congressional goal of “ensuring prompt resolution of 
challenges to EPA’s actions” and established that its interpretation 
of § 509(b) was motivated by practicality rather than formality.243 
Congress has not amended § 509(b) since either of these rulings 
and can be understood to have acquiesced in the Court’s interpre-
tation of § 509(b). 
5. Section 509(b) overcomes Bell’s presumption. 
To overcome Bell’s presumption under the Block standard, 
there must be both an omission of explicit finality language and 
other factors indicating congressional intent.244 The intent to over-
ride the presumption must be “fairly discernible.”245 That standard 
is met here. The text of § 509(b) contains no finality language, and 
so the “specific language” requirement is satisfied. Additional 
Block factors indicate that Congress intended to allow for review 
of nonfinal action. The CWA’s legislative history supports over-
coming Bell’s presumption. Importantly, the legislative history 
does not mention that review is to be limited to final actions. The 
statutory scheme presents nonfinal actions in § 509(b)’s ancillary 
statutes that govern, influence, and have the precise effect of 
determining the substance of the EPA’s final action. The Court 
has found these types of actions to be within the meaning of 
§ 509(b)’s enumerated actions. Further, unlike the statutory 
schemes in other statutes that courts have found to contain a fi-
nality requirement, the statutes related to § 509(b) do not discuss 
 
decisis. See American Portland, 101 F3d at 776 (“That the court has taken jurisdiction in 
the past does not affect the analysis because jurisdictional issues that were assumed but 
never expressly decided in prior opinions do not thereby become precedents.”), citing 
Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 631 (1993). 
 240 E.I. du Pont, 430 US at 136. 
 241 Id at 127–28 & n 18. 
 242 Crown Simpson, 445 US at 196. 
 243 Id. 
 244 See note 164 and accompanying text. 
 245 See note 168 and accompanying text. 
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a final agency action requirement. Finally, Congress acquiesced 
in the Court’s practical construction of § 509(b) in E.I. du Pont by 
not amending the statute in the 1977 revisions. That Congress 
explicitly required finality in the CAA but not the CWA also 
serves as an interstatutory argument in favor of overcoming the 
Bell presumption. Moreover, there has been no revision of 
§ 509(b) in response to the Court’s pragmatic holding in Crown 
Simpson, which allowed for review of a nonfinal action. Block’s 
factors246 all weigh in favor of finding that § 509(b) overcomes 
Bell’s presumption. Section 509(b) should not be read as subject 
to Bell’s presumption in favor of requiring final agency action for 
judicial review. 
B. Relying on Ripeness in the Absence of Finality 
This Section argues that, even without the finality require-
ment to filter out frivolous actions, courts can rely on the ripeness 
doctrine to determine whether judicial review is appropriate in 
§ 509(b) cases. The doctrine’s two-pronged inquiry into whether 
an issue is “fit” for review and the potential hardship to the 
parties of withholding review247 should allow courts to take a more 
flexible approach that is unconstrained by a rigid finality require-
ment. First, this Section demonstrates that some courts, though 
using the language of finality, have relied on the ripeness doctrine 
to determine whether to allow direct review. Then, this Section 
argues that relying on ripeness in the absence of a finality re-
quirement in § 509(b) provides a cohesive analytical switch that 
is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence and largely 
consistent with lower-court case law surrounding § 509(b)(1).248 
This Section highlights the types of cases in which removing the 
finality requirement and applying only the ripeness doctrine 
would have led to a different outcome. Finally, this Section argues 
that removing the finality requirement from § 509(b) is welfare 
maximizing. 
 
 246 The factors consist of the statute’s specific language, legislative history, structure, 
the congressional acquiescence in the Supreme Court’s expansive functional reading of the 
statute, and the statute’s purpose to provide prompt resolution of challenges to EPA action. 
See Part II.B.2. 
 247 See text accompanying notes 33–38. 
 248 The Third Circuit’s ruling in Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources 
was based on the argument that the district court had proper jurisdiction as the issue 
was covered under the CWA’s citizen-suit provision. See Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources, 618 F2d at 994. As finality was not dispositive, this Section 
does not try to explain the decision in ripeness terms. 
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1. Courts have been employing ripeness considerations 
disguised as finality concerns. 
Courts considering jurisdiction under § 509 have already 
used ripeness considerations as a basis for upholding Bell’s 
presumption in favor of requiring finality. In American Paper, for 
example, the court acknowledged it could review the case if the 
policy statement “ever leads to the denial or modification of a per-
mit.”249 The court held that review at that time would be “too soon” 
in that it would have to review the policy “without knowing how 
(or even whether) it would affect any plant.”250 The Seventh Circuit, 
though couching its decision in the language of finality, was 
speaking to the concerns of the Abbott Laboratories ripeness 
test.251 There were no facts to review, only a legal question, but 
there was also no hardship to the parties in withholding review 
because the policy came from a regional office, not the adminis-
trator of the EPA. This reasoning by the court is consistent with 
the doctrine’s purpose of preventing premature adjudication of 
abstract disagreements.252 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in National Pork also fits within 
a ripeness framework. Like the letters in American Paper, the 
letters in National Pork were exclusively legal documents and, 
therefore, fit for review.253 However, the court’s conclusion that 
the letters “merely restate[d]” existing law meant that the 
petitioners would suffer no specific hardship from the denial of 
review.254 Instead of conjuring up a textual finality mandate when 
none exists, the court could have dismissed the case for lack of 
hardship under the ripeness doctrine. 
In Rhode Island, the state appealed a decision while EAB 
proceedings were ongoing.255 The court read § 509(b) as requiring 
final action and stated that review would be available when the 
EPA issued a final permit.256 In discussing whether to apply an 
exception to the finality rule—the collateral order doctrine—the 
court reasoned that Rhode Island’s interests would not be irrepa-
rably harmed in the absence of immediate review.257 The court 
 
 249 American Paper, 882 F2d at 289. 
 250 Id at 289–90. 
 251 See Part I.A.2. 
 252 Abbott Laboratories, 387 US at 148–49. 
 253 National Pork, 635 F3d at 741. 
 254 Id at 756. 
 255 Rhode Island, 378 F3d at 23. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id at 27–28. 
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also acknowledged that refusing to intercede came with a cost 
because it introduced the “prospect of duplicative proceedings 
should the denial of intervention eventually be deemed improvi-
dent.”258 Thus, the court calculated that the hardship of denying 
review to Rhode Island did not outweigh the cost of adhering to the 
finality rule.259 While the court engaged in a cost-benefit analysis 
for purposes of the collateral order doctrine analysis, it engaged 
in the same type of weighing of the hardships required by the 
ripeness inquiry. Having found that Rhode Island would not be 
irreparably harmed by postponing review, the court could have 
dismissed the case solely on ripeness grounds instead of the two-
step process of citing to Bell’s presumption and then declining to 
apply an exception to the finality rule. 
2. Changing the course of Riverkeeper and Champion. 
If removing the finality analysis from § 509(b) results in no 
change from the status quo, this discussion is largely academic. 
There will be no change in outcome when a party attempts to 
appeal a nonripe and nonfinal action. Conversely, removing a 
finality requirement will not affect whether a party can appeal a 
ripe, final action. Removing the finality requirement will affect 
judicial review only in cases in which a party seeks to appeal a 
nonfinal action that is ripe for review. Allowing for review of non-
final actions would have significantly changed the outcome in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Riverkeeper decision and the Fourth Circuit’s 
Champion ruling. This Section discusses why both cases were ripe 
for review, despite their nonfinality, and then the next Section 
argues that removing finality and relying on ripeness to preserve 
judicial economy is welfare maximizing. 
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition for review in 
Riverkeeper because it failed Bennett’s finality test.260 The EPA’s 
partial findings did not “mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s 
decision making process” because, as the court noted, the EPA 
had “the power to revise its findings.”261 While it is impossible to 
know how the court would have ruled based on ripeness, applying 
the ripeness test shows that the case was ripe for review. 
 
 258 Id at 28. 
 259 The court recognized that in some instances, “the costs of finality may outweigh 
its benefits” in the administrative context. Rhode Island, 378 F3d at 24 (referencing the 
collateral order doctrine). 
 260 See Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1082. 
 261 Id. 
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First, the question was fit for review. The EPA had deter-
mined that twenty-two of the alleged deficiencies did not warrant 
initiating withdrawal of the state’s NPDES program.262 The EPA 
had already conducted the relevant factual analysis; no further 
factual development was needed in making determinations as to 
the twenty-two alleged deficiencies, and only legal questions re-
mained. Second, the petitioners would have suffered a hardship 
if the court delayed review. The interim response provided that 
the EPA would defer a final decision to allow more time “for EPA 
to work with [Alabama] to address the issues and/or to allow 
additional time to monitor [Alabama’s] program implementation 
and progress.”263 Not specifying a timeline or date by which the 
EPA would make a decision constituted a hardship for the peti-
tioners in that the claimed environmental deficiencies would be 
ongoing during the time the EPA and Alabama worked through 
the remaining issues. The possibility of a monitoring period 
meant that the EPA and Alabama could postpone any final deci-
sion by claiming that a longer period was needed to monitor the 
situation.264 It is not the case that judicial intervention would 
inappropriately interfere with further administrative action.265 
Because the question was fit for review and hardship to the parties 
existed, the case was ripe for review. 
Forgoing finality would also have led to a different outcome 
in Champion. There, the court held that judicial review of the 
EPA’s assumption of permitting authority would be challengeable 
once the EPA issued or denied a permit to Champion.266 The court 
admitted that the EPA’s actions “were actions of the administra-
tor subject to judicial review” under § 509(b) “if those actions were 
allowed to proceed to their logical completion, i.e., EPA either 
 
 262 Id at 1080. 
 263 Letter Brief of the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, Riverkeeper 
v United States Environmental Protection Agency, Civil Action No 14-13508, *3 (11th Cir 
filed Aug 7, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 4873278). 
 264 Courts have recognized the potential for abuse of this situation in the APA context 
(in which finality is required) and have cautioned that “an administrative agency cannot 
legitimately evade judicial review forever by continually postponing any consequence-
laden action and then challenging federal jurisdiction on ‘final agency action’ grounds.” 
National Parks Conservation Association v Norton, 324 F3d 1229, 1239 (11th Cir 2003). 
Construing § 509(b) to allow review of ripe, nonfinal action resolves this same issue in the 
CWA context. 
 265 See Riverkeeper, 806 F3d at 1083 (discussing the “‘pragmatic’ interpretation of 
administrative finality” doctrine). 
 266 Champion, 850 F2d at 190. 
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granting or denying a permit.”267 Removing the finality require-
ment would have freed Champion from waiting until a permit had 
been either denied or approved. The question was fit for review 
because whether the EPA had properly assumed permitting au-
thority was a purely legal question that did not require additional 
factfinding. Champion also suffered hardship from withholding 
review because the EPA’s action had deprived it of its renewed 
state-issued NPDES permit.268 
3. Removing the finality rule would be welfare maximizing. 
As demonstrated above, not applying a finality requirement 
and relying on the ripeness doctrine when deciding whether to 
allow immediate review can change the outcome of § 509(b) cases. 
This is a good thing. Ripeness is a flexible doctrine that, compared 
with the finality rule, results in more equitable and efficient out-
comes. Some courts have declined to rule that § 509(b) overcomes 
Bell’s presumption because of a perceived danger of squandering 
judicial and administrative resources.269 In fact, a robust applica-
tion of the ripeness doctrine should allay these concerns and, in 
some cases, conserve judicial resources. In the Riverkeeper case, 
by withholding review of twenty-two of the claims until the EPA 
made determinations on the remaining four claims, the court in-
centivized petitioners—nonprofit and industry alike—to separate 
claims. The separation of claims will lead to judicial redundancy 
in the next lawsuit; instead of presiding over one case, a judge (or 
several different judges) would have to preside over twenty-six 
discrete actions. Likewise, in Champion, postponing review created 
the possibility of the EPA engaging in the laborious process of 
permit drafting only to later have a court rule that the agency 
improperly assumed permitting authority in the first place. In 
these instances, it is better to allow immediate review. 
Allowing for § 509(b) review of these types of intermediate 
decisions realizes Congress’s vision of “open[ing] wide” the possi-
bilities of meaningful input in government decisions270 and en-
suring the “prompt resolution of challenges to EPA’s actions.”271 
Congress’s concern with opening wide avenues of review was 
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 268 Id at 185. 
 269 See notes 115–30 and accompanying text. 
 270 1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 at 
819 (cited in note 204). See also Crown Simpson, 445 US at 196. 
 271 Crown Simpson, 445 US at 196. 
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prescient. Scholars have demonstrated that agencies seek to in-
sulate their actions from review.272 The Riverkeeper and Champion 
cases are good examples. By postponing a final decision or permit 
issuance, the EPA can postpone review of its determinations and 
other actions. Professor Nina Mendelson has argued that expand-
ing the availability of suits by interested parties can counter 
informal (and often unchecked) agency action.273 Though not a 
citizen-suit provision in the mold of CWA’s § 505 provision, re-
moving the finality rule from § 509(b) would “increase regulatory 
beneficiaries’ [and regulatory losers’] ability to hold agencies 
externally accountable for their implementation of a statute.”274 
One of the purposes of § 509 was to create judicial review that 
would have that precise effect.275 
Finally, it is important to consider the costs and benefits of 
using ripeness in the absence of a strict finality rule. At the outset, 
such a switch would lead to more litigation, not less. This outcome 
alone should not be cause to worry; our legal system favors the 
availability of judicial review of agency action.276 The more salient 
question is whether, because review is already allowed once the 
EPA has taken final action, the benefits of allowing immediate 
review of nonfinal action outweigh the costs. If not, perhaps it 
would be more prudent for courts to continue to enforce a finality 
requirement in § 509(b) cases. 
The additional costs of allowing review are the associated 
litigation costs, the potential disruptions of administrative pro-
ceedings, and the judiciary’s costs in overseeing the litigation.277 
 
 272 See, for example, Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 
126 Harv L Rev 1755, 1756–64 (2013). 
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 277 See American Petroleum Institute v Environmental Protection Agency, 683 F3d 
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For example, allowing immediate review of the twenty-two claims 
in Riverkeeper would impose additional administrative costs on 
the courts, but some of those costs would have been imposed any-
way when the parties appealed after the EPA’s final determina-
tion. It would likely have been the case that review of the EPA’s 
determination regarding the twenty-two alleged deficiencies 
would not have affected the EPA’s actions in working with Alabama 
to correct the other four deficiencies. In the meantime, irreparable 
environmental harm could have occurred. Further, it is not clear 
that the administrative cost of reviewing the twenty-two determi-
nations before the EPA’s final decision is greater than the cost of a 
future case in which a plaintiff, following Riverkeeper’s precedent, 
files separate suits for each alleged deficiency in a different state 
to circumvent the finality problem. 
Courts should therefore allow review when the harm of with-
holding review is greater than the cost of additional litigation. If 
the court anticipates that withholding review would create per-
verse incentives, resulting in undesirable behavior like the claim 
splitting discussed above, it should include those considerations 
in its ripeness calculation. This formulation looks to the extent of 
hardship on the parties and the cost of litigation on the court and 
the parties (including the cost on the agency of administrative 
delay). It is the ripeness doctrine reframed.278 The first prong of 
the ripeness inquiry is whether the issue is “fit” for review. An 
issue is fit for review if it is legal in nature and does not require 
additional factfinding.279 Empirical scholarship has revealed 
 
 278 The DC Circuit has similarly framed the ripeness inquiry in the APA context. 
Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v Heckler, 789 F2d 931, 940 (DC 
Cir 1986) (“In order to outweigh institutional interests in the deferral of review, the hardship 
to those affected by the agency’s action must be immediate and significant.”). 
 279 In APA cases, in which final agency action is required, courts include the finality 
requirement in its determination of whether an issue is fit for review. See, for example, 
American Petroleum Institute, 683 F3d at 387 (explaining that the fitness of an issue for 
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would ‘benefit from further factual development,’ and therefore cases presenting purely 
legal questions are more likely to be fit for judicial review.” Iowa League, 711 F3d at 867. 
Because § 509(b) does not contain an explicit finality requirement, this Comment does not 
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Co, 473 US 568, 581 (1985) (finding a non-APA claim fit for review because the “issue 
presented in [the] case is purely legal, and will not be clarified by further factual 
development”). 
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factfinding to be the largest cost of litigation.280 If no additional 
factfinding is required, then the only cost on the court and parties 
is briefing and ruling on the legal issue, as well as any cost result-
ing from delay of the administrative process. The fitness prong of 
the ripeness analysis can thus be seen as a proxy for allowing 
review when the cost of doing so is minimal.281 If a court can settle 
an issue without incurring additional expenses, the issue should 
be fit for review because deferring review would not add any 
marginal benefit to the court’s ability to rule on the issue.282 The 
second prong of the ripeness doctrine is explicitly a cost-measuring 
inquiry. The court must measure the hardship to the parties of 
withholding review.283 In other words, the ripeness doctrine allows 
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review when the cost of withholding review is greater than the 
cost of resolving the issue immediately. 
Unlike the ripeness doctrine, the finality rule does not weigh 
the costs and benefits of allowing review. With a finality require-
ment, some actions for which review is cost justified are not allowed 
to proceed in court. Judges have likely realized the welfare-
negative effect of the finality doctrine. The judicially created 
“pragmatic finality” doctrine and the collateral order doctrine 
allow for judicial review of nonfinal action in circumstances in 
which the courts are bound by an explicit or Bell-imposed finality 
requirement.284 These doctrines allow for review of nonfinal actions 
when those actions are supported by an adequate record and 
withholding review would cause hardship to the parties.285 The 
doctrines give courts flexibility to conduct a “ripeness-light” 
analysis.286 Because § 509(b) does not have an explicit finality 
requirement and can overcome Bell’s presumption, there is no 
need to adopt the contorted pragmatic finality doctrine or worry 
about the collateral order doctrine; ripeness suffices. 
It is possible that Congress intended to restrict judicial 
review for final agency actions. If courts excluded finality consid-
erations and applied only the ripeness analysis in the context of 
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§ 509(b) cases, Congress would always be free to amend the stat-
utes and insert explicit finality requirements. But there is scant 
evidence that Congress intended to disallow review of nonfinal 
action in the § 509(b) context. If anything, an increase in merito-
rious litigation would certainly lift the spirits of the CWA’s drafters, 
who were impressed by the public’s willingness to “turn to legal 
action as a remedy for what they consider to be errors on the part 
of the Government.”287 Allowing this type of input into government 
decisionmaking therefore not only comports with Congress’s desire 
to strengthen the public’s ability to take part in government action 
but also leads to societal welfare gains. 
C. The Preclusion Question 
Having dispensed with Bell’s presumption and demonstrated 
that ripeness by itself is preferable to ripeness in addition to the 
finality rule, one last issue remains—the role of § 509(b)’s review-
preclusion provision. Easterbrook’s fear of expanding § 509(b) so 
much that parties routinely file protective challenges in both dis-
trict and circuit court has been validated.288 If the lack of a finality 
requirement increases the amount of protective duplicative filings, 
the increase in the cost of additional litigation would limit any 
welfare gains made by allowing for review of ripe nonfinal actions. 
Ideally, changing how courts interpret § 509(b) would reduce the 
number of protective filings, but in this case, relying on ripeness 
does not have to affect the volume of protective filings one way or 
the other. 
The text of § 509(b)’s review-preclusion provision starts the 
120-day clock on the date of “such determination, approval, 
promulgation, issuance or denial.”289 As discussed in Part III.A, 
the Court has interpreted these words expansively to include ac-
tions that govern or affect the listed actions. The Court’s broad 
interpretation of what actions are subject to review necessarily 
affects when parties must file for review of those actions. The stat-
ute requires that parties file for review of an action within 120 
days of the date of the action. This gives litigants two options: 
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either challenge the qualifying nonfinal action within the 120-day 
timeframe or wait until the administrator takes a final action and 
then challenge the nonfinal action under the statute’s grant of 
review of the actions the administrator took in making the final 
action. 
For instance, imagine that the EPA makes a pivotal determi-
nation at time T1 that satisfies the Court’s pragmatic approach to 
§ 509(b) review under Crown Simpson and issues a final decision 
denying a permit at time T2. The party that suffered a hardship 
at T1 could challenge the nonfinal EPA action within 120 days of 
T1 or within 120 days of T2 as part of a challenge to the adminis-
trator’s action in the final denial of the permit.290 This interpreta-
tion of the preclusion provision allows for review but does not 
force parties to meticulously challenge every action made by the 
administrator; parties should challenge only actions that meet 
the ripeness requirement. This framework incentivizes parties to 
bring a separate lawsuit on a nonfinal action only when the hard-
ship of delaying review is greater than the benefit of waiting until 
the final action and then consolidating all alleged deficiencies into 
one claim. 
While Easterbrook’s example of a nightmare world in which 
litigants might challenge interoffice memoranda on four-inch 
nozzles makes a (rather dramatic) point, it is also unrealistic. 
Under the proposed framework, litigants will have no additional 
incentive to challenge “everything in sight” because, in most 
instances, it would make sense to bring all the claims at once 
instead of taking a piecemeal approach to litigation. A party should 
only challenge a nonfinal action if the cost of filing a separate suit 
is less than the expected hardship of postponing a challenge.291 
Moreover, any hardship a party might bear from delaying review 
of a rote bureaucratic memo would likely not survive even the 
most lenient ripeness analysis. Easterbrook can rest assured that 
 
 290 This idea is like the “merger rule” in civil litigation. The merger rule states that 
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no procedural morass will result from interpreting § 509(b) to 
authorize review of nonfinal actions. 
* * * 
Relying on ripeness in the absence of a finality rule is a prom-
ising approach to dealing with § 509(b) review. Like finality, the 
ripeness doctrine precludes review in cases in which the costs of 
allowing immediate review of nonfinal action outweigh the gains. 
Ripeness’s flexibility to allow review when the benefits of review 
outweigh the costs makes relying on ripeness without a finality 
requirement a welfare-maximizing approach to § 509(b) review. 
Relying on ripeness alone also furthers the intent of the Congress 
that enacted the CWA by allowing for public input in government 
decisions through judicial review. Employing the ripeness doc-
trine in the absence of finality thus leads to efficiency gains and 
desirable normative outcomes. While this Comment has focused 
on § 509(b), interpreting other statutes to allow for review of non-
final action and applying this Comment’s suggested ripeness 
framework could lead to additional social benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the CWA’s direct-review pro-
vision overcomes Bell’s presumption in favor of requiring finality 
and that courts can rely on the ripeness doctrine as the primary 
framework to decide whether to grant direct appellate review. 
Ripeness furthers the normative interest in allowing for judicial 
review of agency actions and Congress’s intent to increase the op-
portunities for the public to have meaningful input in government 
decisionmaking. Finally, the absence of a finality requirement 
facilitates social welfare gains currently precluded by the finality 
rule’s strict requirements. Judges fearing the consequences of 
declining to find a finality requirement in § 509(b)—and other 
direct-review statutes—need not worry; relying on ripeness in the 
absence of a finality requirement will lead to beneficial results. 
